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ABSTRACT 
 
  This study examines factors that affect the participation behavior of limited 
resource farmers in cost-share programs in Alabama. The data was generated from a 
survey administered to a sample of limited resource farm operators. A binary logit was 
employed to analyze the data. Results indicate that college education, age, total farm size, 
as well as membership in conservation association had significant influence on 
participation. 
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Introduction 
 
Evidence indicates a low participation in government conservation and forest 
management practices among farmers in general and limited resource or small farmers in 
particular. Bell et al. observed a chronically low participation in incentive-based forestry 
programs and CRP in Tennessee even-though these programs enjoy the added incentive 
of an annual rental payment. Also, McLean-Meyinsse, Hui, and Joseph, Dismukes, 
Harwood, and Bentley, and Molnar, Bitto, Brant and Hoban, have all noted lower 
participation in government-sponsored programs among small and limited resource 
farmers. This disparity may be partially due to the small average size of qualified acres, 
lower average crop yields, and higher likelihood of not planting program crops, as well as 
less sophisticated technology, insufficient collateral, poor cash flow, and poor credit 
ratings (GAO, 1997). 
Conservation and forest management practices are designed to increase 
reforestation, improve timber stands, increase wildlife habitat, reduce soil erosion and, 
protect water quality and the environment. They are generally voluntary with some 
incentives provided to participants to encourage their participation (USDA). The 
incentives stem from financial compensation like tax rebates and cost sharing in some 
cases, to non-financial assistance such as technical guidance and provision of seedlings in 
other cases (Nagubadi et al.). With regard to cost-share programs, they are designed to 
provide incentives to agricultural producers to implement soil and water conservation 
practices (Zinn). Specifically, cost-share programs assist land owners by partially paying 
for the expenses of installing conservation practices such as site preparation and seeding, 
tree planting, recreational improvements and, design of resource management plans and   3  
erosion control measures. Some examples of cost-share programs or programs with cost 
share elements are the Emergency Conservation Program (ECP), the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP), the Forest Incentives Program (FIP), the Wetland Reserve 
Program (WRP), the Forest Service Stewardship Incentives Program (FSSIP), and the 
Farmland Protection Program (FPP) (Zinn; Nagubadi, et al.). 
The conservation reserve program remains the most popular among the cost-share 
programs in Alabama, with over 10,000 contracts and approximately 484,129 acres 
enrolled prior to year 2000, additional 967 contracts on 39,713 acres were signed on, in 
2000 (NRCS Report). Initiated in 1985 with the objective of reducing soil erosion on 
highly erodible cropland, CRP provides cost-share money to establish the required 
conservation plan and rental payment to farmers. In return, farmers are required to 
withdraw land from crop production and to plant permanent tree or grass coverage for a 
full contract period of 10-15 years. 
Several studies have been conducted to examine the factors that affect 
participation in government-sponsored programs. While the results could be generalized 
for policy purposes in some cases, they have not been consistent across the states. For 
instance, in a study of Forest Stewardship Incentive Program in Tennessee, Bell et al. 
found farmers’ attitude towards conservation and knowledge of forestry to be more 
significant indicators of participation than monetary incentive. In contrast, Norris and 
Batie in a study of soil conservation decisions in Virginia concluded that financial factors 
as well as other socioeconomic factors were the influential variables. Therefore, the 
variables of importance may differ depending on the state and the program. This suggests 
the need and importance to study the participation behavior in other states or regions.   4  
Furthermore, while participation behavior in cost-share programs has been examined in 
several states, no study has been done to evaluate the behavior of Alabama farmers. This 
study will attempt to fill this void and further contribute to the existing literature on 
participation in government sponsored-programs.  
The objective of this study was to evaluate factors that affect limited resource 
farmers’ (LRFs) participation in cost-share programs in Alabama. Following Molnar et 
al., the term limited resource farmers in this study refers to farmers with annual gross 
farm sales of less than or equal to $40,000. The next section provides a review of the 
relevant literatures. This is followed by a discussion of the data description, the 
theoretical framework and empirical model employed. The results are then presented 
followed by a summary of conclusions and policy implications. 
 
Review of Literature  
This research effort was motivated by a need to understand the distinguishing 
characteristics of participants in cost-share programs.  Participation behavior in 
government-sponsored programs has been extensively addressed. This section attempts to 
identify and summarize key variables used in previous studies. According to Ervin and 
Ervin, literature on factors affecting adoption practices and use of soil conservation 
practices began to emerge in 1950. However, there is limited guidance for the selection of 
variables to explain the resource conservation actions of farmers from economic theory. 
However, Prundeaner and Zwerman noted in 1958 that while there may be the same level 
of hazard between farms, producers differ in implementation of soil conservation 
schemes due to different socioeconomic environments. Bell et al. examined the likely   5  
effect of cost-share incentives on participation in the Tennessee Forest Stewardship 
Program and identified other factors that contribute to participation using a random utility 
model. Their results indicate that attitudes and knowledge of forestry programs may be 
more influential in a landowner’s decision to participate than monetary incentives. Norris 
and Batie analyzed farmers’ soil conservation decisions using data from a survey of farm 
operators in two Virginia counties. They concluded that financial factors (income and 
debt), perception of erosion, educational level, off-farm employment, and tenancy were 
important influences on the sample farmers’ use of conservation practices. In addition, 
age, race, and on-farm erosion potential were significantly related to the use of 
conservation tillage. Similarly, in a study of conservation practice choice of CRP farmers 
in Alabama, Onianwa, Wheelock, and Hendrix analyzed 594 randomly selected 
Conservation Reserve Program contracts and found education, ratio of cropland in CRP, 
farm size, gender, prior crop practice, and geographic location of contract to have 
significant influence on the choice of conservation practice adopted. Nagubadi et al. in a 
study of program participation behavior of non-industrial forest landowners in Indiana 
found total land owned, commercial reasons for ownership, government sources of 
information, and membership in forestry organizations to significantly influence 
landowners’ program participation.  Other significant factors include: age, fear of loss of 
property rights, and duration since the first wooded tract was acquired. However, with 
regard to cost-share programs, location of residence on wooded land, knowledge of and 
willingness to participate in a conservation easement influenced participation. Also, 
Kalaitzandonakes and Monson investigated the influence of economic, personal, and 
attitudinal factors on intended conservation effort of a sample of conservation reserve   6  
program contract holders in Missouri at the end of their contracts and found that 
economic factors such as greater risk aversion and low discount rates had positive and 
significant effect on potential conservation effort, while increasing debt load was found 
to have a negative influence on potential conservation effort. However, attitudes towards 
conservation were found to have no significant influence on potential conservation effort. 
Finally, Lynn, Shonkwiler, and Rola, using an extension of the tobit model examined 
attitudes and farmer conservation behavior of Florida farmers. The results indicated that 
strengthening conservation attitudes would reduce the need for dependence on technical 
assistance and other net income-enhancing programs. They concluded that although 
economic incentives will increase effort, responsiveness would differ with the 
strengthening of conservation related attitudes. These aforementioned studies provide a 
basis for selecting variables to empirically examine the program participation behavior of 
limited resource farmers in this study. 
 
Data Description   
 
The data for this study was generated through a mail survey. The survey was 
designed to solicit pertinent information to facilitate the study.  Information relating to 
the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents and their participation in cost-share 
programs were requested. The mail survey was administered through the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) office in Montgomery, Alabama. The 1997 
Census of Agriculture of more than 41,000 Alabama farmers maintained by the NASS 
and stratified for limited resource farmers served as the population for the study. These 
strata consisted of 1,340 minority farm operators and over 24 thousand white farm   7  
operators reporting less than $40 thousand in cash receipts. From this population, five 
percent (1,215) of the white farm operators were randomly selected, while all the 
minority operators were included to ensure adequate representation of both groups. The 
survey was pre-tested and modified accordingly prior to mailing. A total of 217 minority 
farm operators and 233 white farm operators completed and returned the surveys from 
the first round of mailing. To boost the response, a follow-up survey was mailed to non-
respondents. This effort resulted in additional 135 minority responses and 215 white 
responses, yielding a combined total of 800 respondents. However, 77 surveys were 
excluded from the analysis due to incomplete information. The remaining 723 surveys 
comprising 313 minority farmers and 410 white farmers were tabulated for the final 
analysis. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Model 
Indirect Utility Function 
 
  A random utility model was used to determine the probability that a limited 
resource farmer will choose to participate in the cost-share program. Following Bell et al. 
the indirect utility function can be specified as a linear function with the individual 
subscript suppressed: 
 
ψι  = β0 + β1D + β2Y + β3F +β4Ρ + β5Μ + β6Ζ + ε……………………………..(1) 
 
Where ψι is the indirect utility received by the individual from participating (ι=1) or not 
participating (ι=0) in the cost-share program; D is a vector of personal socioeconomic   8  
characteristics that influence participation in participation; Y is income from all sources; 
F is the farm size; P is participation in other government programs; M is membership in 
any conservation organization; and Z is a vector of Alabama agricultural reporting 
districts as defined by the NASS. βι s are the parameters of the model with β1 and β6  each 
representing vectors of parameters. 
 
The Logit Model 
  Following Gujarati, the probability of participating in cost-share program is given 
by: 
 
          ( ) () 2 1 . .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... ι βΧ Σ = Χ = Υ Ε = Ρ i i i t  
 
Where, Pt is the probability that Y equals 1 for given values of X for all i = 0…n 
represents the explanatory variables; βΟ represents the intercept, and βi represents 
coefficients to be estimated. 
Given the dichotomous nature of the data, logit model as originally suggested by 
Berkson and redefined by Theil was adopted to analyze the data. In cumulative logistic 
distribution, Equation 2 can be represented as: 
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Where, e is the base of the natural logarithm. For simplification, Equation 3 could be 












Where: i Z is a linear combination (β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 +….+ βnXn) and ranges from  
-∞ to  ∞ + , Pt  ranges between 0 and 1. If Pt represents the probability of participating in 
cost-share programs, then (1 – Pt) represents the probability of not participating in cost-









1 ………………………………………(5)                                        
 
 























 is the odds ratio of participating in cost-share program, which is the ratio of the 
probability that limited resource farmers would participate to the probability that limited 
resource farmers would not participate in cost-share program. Taking the natural log of  
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 Where:   10  
L i is the log of the odds of participation in cost-share programs called the logit and 
Xi are the independent variables. Pt is the conditional probability of a farmer 




The dependent variable (PART) is a dichotomous variable of participating or not 
participating in cost-share programs. A value of “1” was assigned for those respondents 
who participated in at least one cost-share program and “0” was assigned for those who 
had not participated in any. Thirty percent of the respondents (219) participated in at least 
one cost-share program. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable are presented in 
Table 1. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in the logit model are also summarized with the 
descriptive statistics in Table 1. Twelve dummy variables were created to facilitate the 
analysis. A dummy variable was used to distinguish between male and female, and it was 
hypothesized that males will be less likely to participate in cost-share program than 
females. Race was also represented with a dummy variable with minority ‘1’ and white 
“0”. The minority consists of all non-white respondents. In this case, minorities were 
hypothesized to have a negative sign, suggesting that they were less likely to participate. 
Other dummy variables include: education, with college graduate ‘1’ and less than 
college graduate ‘0’, part-time farmers, membership in conservation organization, and 
participation in other non-cost-share government programs. Education, part-time farming,   11  
participation in other non-cost-share government programs, and membership in any 
conservation association were all hypothesized to have a positive effect on participation 
in cost-share programs. Other variables in the model include age, which was a continuous 
variable, and total acre. They were both hypothesized to have positive effects on 
participation. An interaction term for minority-owned acres was added to distinguish the 
effect of minority-owned acres from white owned acres. 
Furthermore, six dummy variables were created for the agricultural reporting 
districts following NASS classification to permit the examination of the regional impacts 
on cost-share administration (see figure). DIST 1 and DIST 2 represent the “Tennessee 
Valley,” comprised of substantial real estate development (commercial, industrial, and 
residential) and premium cropland. Extending across the state, DIST 3 is home to two 
national forests, Talladega  and Bankhead, and is parallel to DIST 4. DIST 4 is 
affectionately termed the “Black Belt,” because of the dark soil color characterizing this 
region. DIST 5 and DIST 6, located in the southwestern and southeastern parts of the 
state, respectively, are home to most of Alabama’s privately owned pine forests. 




Two empirical models were estimated. The first one was without the district 
dummy variables, and the second one incorporated the district dummy variables. The 
estimated results of the first model are presented in Table 2. The maximum likelihood 
estimated coefficients, the Wald tests, the changes in probability, as well as the   12  
likelihood-ratio test, the Nagelkerke R
2, and the prediction success statistics are 
presented. Measures of goodness of fit indicate that the model fits the data fairly well. 
The likelihood-ratio test, which measures the significance of the logit function, was 
highly significant with a score of 92.9, suggesting that there exists a relationship between 
the probability of a farmer choosing to participate and the suggested independent 
variables. Although the R
2 value is low, which is the norm in logistic regression (Hosmer 
and Lemeshow), the model correctly predicted 68.7 percent (497 out of 723) of the 
responses using a 30 percent participation rate. Correct predictions were relatively evenly 
distributed with 72.8 percent of non-participants (367 out of 504), and 59.4 percent of 
participants (130 out of 219) correctly predicted.  
Following Bell et al. and, Pindyck and Rubinfeld, the estimated results were 
interpreted using the change in probability (∆Pi) at the mean: 
 
) 8 ........( .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... )......... 1 ( i i i P Pi − Ρ = ∆ β  
 
 where  Pi is the estimated probability of participation at each observation; and βi is 
the estimated coefficient. The change in probability ( i P ∆ ) is a function of the 
probability and when multiplied by 100 gives the percentage change in the probability of 
the event occurring given a change in the variable, all things being equal.  
The results indicate that education (college graduates), age, and total acres 
(owned and rented regardless of race) were positively significant with participation in 
cost-share program at the five percent level. This means that the probability of 
participation will be higher for limited resource farmers who are older, have higher   13  
education, and more acres of land. The change in probability with regard to education 
suggests that college graduates were 4.3 percent more likely to participate in cost-share 
programs than farmers without a college degree. In the case of age, a unit increase in age 
will result in approximately 0.3 percent increase in participation, and a unit increase in 
total acres would result in a 0.04 percent increase in the probability of farmer 
participation. While the total acreage variable had a positive impact on participation, the 
minority acreage interaction term was not significantly greater as had been the case of 
total acres variable. Membership in conservation organization was also positively 
significant with participation in cost-share programs, although at the .075 level. 
Compared to nonmembers, membership in any conservation organization would increase 
the probability of participating in cost-share programs by 5.1 percent.  
The variables: males, minorities, part-time farming, and participation in other 
non-cost-share conservation programs were not significant, although males, part-time 
farming, and participation in other non-cost-share conservation programs had the 
expected signs. Contrary to expectation, the minority variable had a positive but non-
significant sign. This may be due to the fact that minority in this study includes all other 
non-white races. The interaction term, which was created to examine the effect of 
minority-owned acres on participation, exhibited a positive but non-significant 
relationship 
Table 3 presents the estimated maximum likelihood coefficients, the Wald tests, 
the changes in probability, the likelihood-ratio test, the Nagelkerke R
2, and the prediction 
success statistics for the model with the agricultural reporting districts. Again, measures 
of goodness of fit indicate that the model fits the data fairly well. The likelihood-ratio test   14  
was highly significant with a score of 95.5, suggesting that there was a relationship 
between the probability of a farmer choosing to participate and the suggested variables. 
The Nagelkerke  R
2  in this case was .18 and the model correctly predicted 69.16 percent 
(500 out of 723) of the responses. Correct predictions were again relatively evenly 
distributed with 73 percent of non-participants (369 out of 504), and 60 percent of 
participants (131 out of 219) correctly predicted.  
The results show that introduction of agricultural districts have little or no effect 
on the model. Again, education (college graduates), age, and total acres were positively 
significant with participation in cost-share program at the five percent level, suggesting 
that the probability of participation will be higher for limited resource farmers with 
higher education, large acres of land, and older in age, irrespective of the region. The 
change in probability with regard to education suggests that participants with college 
degrees were 3.4 percent more likely to participation in cost-share programs than those 
with no degrees. Also, a unit increase in age will result in approximately .3 percent 
increase in participation, while a unit increase in number of acres would result in a 0.04 
percent increase in the probability of participating.  
Again, membership in conservation organization was positively significant with 
participation in cost-share programs at the 10 percent level. Membership in conservation 
organization would result in 4.5 percent increase in the probability of participating in 
cost-share programs.  
The variables: males, minorities, part-time farming, and participation in other 
non-cost-share conservation programs were not significant although males, part-time   15  
farming, and participation in other conservation programs had the expected signs. Again, 
the minority variable and the minority-owned acres were positive but non-significant. 
The effect of income on participation was also examined in both models using 
gross farm receipt as a proxy for income. However, the results were not significantly 
different from these results. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
This research examined factors affecting participation in cost-share programs in 
Alabama. The results indicate that college education, age, and total acres owned were 
significant predictors of participation in cost-share programs. For example, the results 
from the first model showed that participants with college degrees have four percent 
higher probability of participating in cost-share program than those with no college 
degrees. Similarly, for each unit increase in the age of the farm operator or total acres 
there was approximately, 3 or .04 percent increases in participation, respectively. 
Furthermore, membership in conservation organization was a significant indicator of 
participation in cost-share programs. Limited resource farmers who were members in any 
conservation organization had about five percent higher probability of participating in 
cost-share programs. This is probably due to the fact that farmers that belong to 
conservation associations are more environmentally conscious and therefore much more 
likely to participate in conservation programs. This result is consistent with the findings 
of Nagubadi et al., which stated that membership in forestry organization was a 
significant influence on participation.   16  
 With the exception of race, all the remaining variables had the expected signs, 
although they were not significant. In contrast, minority participants had a positive but 
non-significant sign. This may be due to the differential effect of higher participation 
rates of minorities among members of conservation organizations.  
  The results of the second model with the agricultural districts were consistent with 
the first model, suggesting that regional differences had no effect on participation in cost-
share programs. Again, college education, age, and total white-owned acres were positive 
and significantly related to participation in cost-share programs. Also, membership in 
conservation organization was positive but significant at the 10 percent level. There were 
no significant differences between the agricultural districts with regard to participation in 
cost-share programs as revealed by the results 
  From a policy perspective, the results of this study provide further insights into 
the characteristics of participants in cost-share programs. This information would assist in 
designing policies to enhance cost-share programs in particular and other government-
sponsored programs in general. Zabawa, Madden and Tischbein, and DeWalt have all 
noted the importance of directing agricultural policy to specific clientele to be effective.  
Consequently, to enhance participation in cost-share programs, different strategies could 
be designed to target specific groups of farmers based on their educational background, 
age, size of farm, as well as whether or not they are affiliated to conservation 
organizations.  
Membership in a conservation organization was a minimal nine percent of the 
sample, but was a significant predictor (p=.075) of participation in a cost share program. 
Regardless of race, cost-share program participation was greater among conservation   17  
awareness organization members than among non-members. The results suggest that a 
more inclusive membership campaign by way of formal conservation organizations 
would significantly increase cost-share conservation program participation. This may be 
particularly true of minority farmers who may be out of the loop with regard to informal 
conservation groups. Therefore, government agencies may find collaborations with non-
governmental conservation organizations an effective means through which farmer 
stewardship of land and water resources could be encouraged while reducing 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates and statistical relationships of factors affecting 
participation in cost-share programs without the regions 
 










Constant -2.6284  .5714  21.1585  .000  - 
Males -.3513  .2580  1.8534  .1734  -.01616 
Minorities  .2341 .2494  .8813 .3479  .01794 
College Graduates**  .4662  .1888  6.0972  .0135  .04315 
Age**   .0183  .0077  5.7096  .0169  .00266 
Part-time Farmers  .1997  .1852  1.1636  .2807  .01487 
























Total  Acres  (White)**  .0042 .0008  27.8389  .000 .00044 
Minority-owned  Acres  .0006 .0014  .1984 .6560  .00032 
        
Log-Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
      
92.99 
Nagelkerke R
2        0.17 
Prediction  Success        68.7 
** denotes significant at 5% level 
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Table 3. Parameter estimates and statistical relationships of factors affecting 
participation in cost-share programs with the districts 
 
 










Constant -2.8479  .6347  20.1351  .000   
Males -.3351  -.2602  1.6585  .1978  -.01281 
Minorities .2374  .2522  .8866  .3464  .01514 
College  graduates**  .4454  .1898 5.5109  .0189 .03389 
Age**  .0199  .0078 6.5395  .0106 .00266 
Part-time  Farmers  .2008  .1863 1.1625  .2809 .01241 
Part.in other Programs  .0584  .2242  .0679  .7945  .00319 
Memb.in any Cons. Org*  .5453  .2992  3.3202  .0684  .04507 
Total Acres (White)**  .0042  .008  26.9419  .000  .00037 
Minority acres   .0007  .0014  .2922  .5888  .00046 
District 1  .1980  .3276  .3653  .5456  .01220 
District 2  .1381  .3000  .2120  .6452  .00808 
District  3  .3895  .3509 1.2320  .2670 .02828 
District 4  -.0839  .3249  .0667  .7962  -.00403 
District 5  .0826  .3468  .0567  .8118  .00460 
         
Log-Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
     
             95.48 
Nagelkerke R
2                   .18 
Prediction Success               69.16 
** denotes significant at 5% level 
*    denotes significant at 10% level 